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POLITICAL LIBERALISMS 
Political liberalism is not merely the name of a book by John Rawls.' It is a distinctive approach to the problem of political power. How best to define and realize these distinctive 
aspirations? 
Rawls's book is a good place to look for answers-provided you 
recognize that he is doing two things at once. The first is to propose 
a general framework for political liberalism. The second is to reas- 
sure us that his new framework is consistent with his older A Theory 
of Justice. * 
I am skeptical about the second enterprise, but applaud the first. 
Since Rawls's new project expresses many of the aims of my own 
work, part I is a search for common ground-defining six principles 
elucidating the distinctive character of political liberalism. The rest 
of the essay tries to detach these larger aspirations from Rawls's 
particular efforts to realize them. Part I1 considers how well A 
Theory of Justice has survived the journey to Political Liberalism, 
comparing the former's contractarianism with the dialogic approach 
I developed in Social Justice in the Liberal S t ~ t e . ~  I argue that nei- 
ther Rawls's arguments for the veil of ignorance nor his coymit- 
ment to the difference principle remain intact. In contrast, the 
strong egalitarian commitments of The Liberal State are entirely 
compatible with the premises of Political Liberalism. 
The next part inspects the very modest foundations Rawls builds 
for his project. He presents himself as a philosophical underlaborer, 
merely elaborating principles already implicit in Western political 
practice. I deny that political liberalism is-or ought to be-para- 
sitic on practice. Nor should we allow ourselves to be charmed by 
Rawls's self-effacing modesty. It conceals an alarming tendency to 
glorify the nation-state. Compared with other conservative national- 
isms, Rawls's is a mild case. But, under present world conditions, 
this is not a disease of the spirit which should pass unnoticed. 
I. COMMON GROUND 
[Tlhe diversity of reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical, 
and moral doctrines found in modern democratic societies is not a 
mere historical condition that may soon pass away; it is a permanent 
feature of the public culture of democracy (PL 36). 
' Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia, 1993). Henceforth cited as PL. 
Cambridge: Harvard, 197 1. 
New Haven: Yale, 1980. Henceforth cited as LS. 
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Rawls's focus is characteristic of American political philosophy. 
With good reason: if America cannot confront the problem of plu- 
ralism, it is finished as a nation. While it will take more than good 
philosophy for success, there can be no denying the crucial impor- 
tance of Rawls's question. How are we to build a viable sense of 
political community amidst all this bewildering, and profound, di- 
versity? 
I emphasize six elements in the liberal response. The first involves 
a principled reluctance to embed political commitments in any sin- 
gle comprehensive philosophy of life. Whenever we do this, we 
alienate other members of the community who have affirmed com- 
peting ideals in life. Rather than hold political principles hostage to 
any single and determinate ideal, the challenge is to design a doc- 
trine that, as much as possible, "does not depend on the truth of any 
single metaphysical or epistemologcal ~ystem."~ 
It follows, second, that political liberalism adopts a distinctive 
strategy of justification. It seeks to explain to holders of different 
comprehensive views why it makes sense for each to adopt liberal 
principles. Obviously, the reasons most compelling to a neo-Kantian 
will be different from (and sometimes inconsistent with) those which 
attract a liberal Catholic. But if political liberalism can be justified 
from religious as well as secular perspectives, if it can appeal to anti- 
as well as neo-Kantians, why alienate potential supporters unneces- 
sarily? 
We should, instead, work hard at building all possible bridges to 
the liberal state. While each bridge may look very different, each 
provides a different group of fellow travellers with compelling rea- 
sons for engagng in a common project of political cooperation. 
Rawls sums up this distinctive strategy by calling it the search for an 
"overlapping consensus." But truth to tell, he does not advance this 
bridge-building expedition beyond the surveys attempted earlier by 
Charles Larmore and my~el f .~  
This is too bad, since it would be a mistake to take Rawls's "over- 
lapping" aspiration as if it were an accomplished fact. There are 
many different paths to political liberalism, but there are many that 
lead away. At present, we do not have a clear sense of the key con- 
ceptual points at which different paths converge and diverge. Take 
Roman Catholicism. There are liberal Catholics like David Tracy, 
T o  emphasize my agreement with this central Rawlsian aspiration, I have 
lifted this quotation f rom m y  o w n  work,  LS 361. P L  elaborates similar ideas at pp. 
11-5, 29-35. 
Compare PL 145-6, with Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity ( N e w  Y o r k :  
Cambridge, 19871, ch. 3, and LS, sect. 71. 
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and there are antiliberal ones like Alasdair Ma~In tyre .~  Both are 
thoughtful writers and serious Catholics; but it is obviously easier to 
build reasonable bridges to Tracy than to MacIntyre. What precisely 
makes it easier? Only by answering such questions can we map the 
conceptual boundaries of "overlapping consensus." 
Nonetheless, the general strategy of justification is clear enough 
to generate a third basic principle. Liberal doctrine should try to be 
"free-standingu-capable of coherent statement that is indepen- 
dent of any particular comprehensive philosophy. Although Rawls 
does not quite make the relationship clear, this principle follows 
directly from the "overlap" strategy. If liberal doctrine were not 
"free-standing," the only alternative would be to present it as an 
integral part of a particular comprehensive philosophy. But this 
would defeat the entire point of "overlap"-since other groups 
could hardly be expected to accept a doctrine presented in such a 
sectarian way. 
I find Rawls's treatment of a fourth principle-the idea of public 
reason-even more enlightening. In one of his most important 
breaks with earlier work, Rawls renounces his claim that "the theory 
of justice is a part of the theory of rational decision" (PL 53, n. 7). 
His new aim is to express reasonable grounds for cooperation 
among parties who differ as to the meaning of the good life. But 
what is it to be reasonable when citizens differ on so much? 
Rawls's answer provides one of the high points of the book. Citi- 
zens must be prepared "to explain their vote to one another in 
terms of a reasonable balance of public values" (PL 243). They must 
display "a willingness to listen to others and a fairmindedness in 
deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be 
made" (PL 217). This overriding commitment to public dialogue 
leads Rawls in a direction he usually finds uncongenial. As I have 
suggested, Rawls gets very uncomfortable whenever he senses him- 
self moving beyond principles already established in Western politi- 
cal practice. So far as public dialogue is concerned, however, he 
throws caution to the winds, and challenges the way Americans un- 
derstand the electoral process. 
When most people step into the voting booth, they believe that 
they have a right to cast their ballot any way they like: maybe I am 
voting for X because he is Jewish, or because he reminds me of my 
father, or because he did my son a favor, but this is nobody's busi- 
ness but my own! Rawls is not prepared to live with this cavalier 
Compare MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: Univer- 
sity Press, 1988) with Tracy, The Analogical Imagination (New York: Crossroads, 
1981) and Dialogue with the Other (Louvain: Peeters, 1990). 
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attitude: "the ideal of public reason not only governs the public 
discourse of elections . . . , but also how citizens are to cast their 
vote. . . . Otherwise, public discourse runs the risks of being hypo- 
critical: citizens talk before one another one way and vote another" 
(PL 215). 
While Rawls's view may seem quaintly old-fashioned, I think he is 
right to urge us to rethink the act of voting.' Legitimate government 
is not based on the unfettered act of personal will, but the collective 
effort by each of us to justify our political power through public 
dialogue. The secret ballot is valuable only because it shields us from 
coercive efforts by others to impose their will when they have failed 
to convince us through argument. But this valuable shield should 
not be transformed into a sword that allows a majority of voters to 
impose their will on others in ways they are not prepared to justify in 
public. 
Political liberalism's overriding commitment to public dialogue 
takes on new force when we incorporate a fifth element into the 
basic framework. I call this the principle of conversational constraint: 
before a liberal citizen offers up a reason in public dialogue, it is not 
enough for her to find it persuasive. She must also convince herself 
that other citizens can find it reasonable despite the fact that they 
will keep on disagreeing about the ultimate meaning of life. Other- 
wise, she must accept the necessity of conversational constraint, and 
refrain from imposing her controversial notions of reasonableness 
on fellow citizens. 
Once again, I am entirely prepared to sign this provision of the 
new Rawlsian contract. My disagreement arises only at the next 
stage, where we proceed to propose particular constraints on the 
ongoing dialogue in the name of political liberalism. Rawls contin- 
ues to believe that the veil of ignorance should serve as an organiz- 
ing device for modeling the admissible range of public reasons. I do 
not. But before turning to this and other differences, I want to map 
a final zone of convergence. 
The sixth point is not a new departure for Rawls, and has pro- 
foundly influenced me ever since I heard his lectures as a student in 
the early 1960s. This involves the central importance of the basic 
structure of society in the theory of justice. Here is where political 
liberals differ from libertarians. We do, and they do not, recognize 
that each citizen's starting point in life is pervasively shaped by the 
family, the educational system, the distribution of wealth, the insti- 
tution of private property, and the organization of the marketplace. 
'S e e  m y  W e  the People: Volume I, Foundations (Cambridge:  Harvard,  1991),ch. 
9. 
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Liberals refuse to treat these basic institutions as if they were pro- 
duced by an invisible hand reaching out from the state of nature. 
We insist on subjecting them to democratic control. Before these 
fundamental structures can be considered legtimate, they must sur- 
vive the rigorous test of public dialogue by free and equal citizens 
who respect each others' right to disagree about the ultimate mean- 
ing of life (PL, Lecture 7). 
11. IS RAWLS A RAWLSIAN? 
To sum up the distinctive promise of political liberalism, consider its 
challenge to one of the great banalities of our time. On countless 
occasions, I have heard thoughtful people tell me that "liberalism" 
is only compatible with an "instrumental" form of reason. Citing 
Hobbes or Hume or some other "dead white European male," my 
fashionable critic tells me that liberals cannot reason about ends, 
but only about the efficient means of achieving them. 
To which I say, let the dead bury their dead. Political liberalism 
will live or die in an effort to construct a constitutive form of public 
reason-one that allows very different sorts of people to reason 
together on fundamental questions of social justice. Given the per- 
vasive skepticism of the present moment, this effort will not gener- 
ate tons of applause. But we shall not get anywhere if we allow 
trendy skepticism to paralyze us. We must begin to reason about 
liberal reason. 
After all, it is possible to construct many different models of politi- 
cal dialogue that seem broadly consistent with the six ideas sketched 
in the preceding section. What is at stake in elaborating one model 
rather than another? 
I do not really know, and it will take a lot more discussion by a lot 
more people before we can find out. But the dialogue must begm 
somewhere, and so I propose to contrast Rawls's particular model 
of public reason with the one advanced in The Liberal State. To 
nobody's surprise, I shall conclude that my model is better. If this 
sparks you to disagree, and come up with something of your own, so 
much the better. Political liberalism is bigger than both of us; and its 
fate will be determined by the breadth and depth of the ensuing 
dialogue-among the readers of this JOURNAL, and in the larger 
community. 
1. Veils oflgnorance. Suppose, then, a society of political liberals 
deliberating upon the principles that should organize the basic 
structure of their institutions. How should they proceed with public 
dialogue? 
Not by placing themselves behind a "veil of ignorance." True, this 
thought experiment prevents the parties from designing principles 
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that favor themselves or their comprehensive theories of the good. 
Since, by hypothesis, citizens are political liberals, they will find this 
a desirable feature of the veiling procedure. 
But if this is their sole objective,' there is a more straightforward 
way of achieving it. They may simply adopt a protocol that forbids 
them from engaging in justificatory arguments that require any citi- 
zen to assert that he or his conception of the good is superior to his 
fellow citizens'. To put the point in Rawlsian terminology, citizens 
may skip the stage of the orignal position and proceed directly to 
specify appropriate constraints on their use of public reason. 
This is precisely the procedure proposed in The Liberal State. The 
last paragraph restates the neutrality principle I proposed as a fun- 
damental constraint on political dialogue. By proceeding to adopt 
neutrality as their first move in liberal politics, citizens avoid the 
need ever to speak of themselves as if they were "unencumbered 
selves," stripped of all social identity. The political conversation be- 
gins in a very different spirit-with the participants pledging them- 
selves to construct a new dimension to their social identity. If they 
had not engaged in liberal dialogue, their identity would have been 
constituted solely by other social engagements-with their families, 
jobs, religious communities, and the like. Now, however, they are 
pledging themselves to add yet another role to their social identity 
-they will, on the relevant occasions, deal with one another as 
citizens of the liberal state, interacting in the special ways regulated 
by their mutual commitment to the liberal conception of public 
reasomg 
My complaint about the Rawlsian veil is reminiscent of, but differ- 
ent from, Michael Sandel's'' critique. He asserts that Rawls's veil 
requires a metaphysical commitment to a neo-Kantian conception of 
the self-in which the essence of personhood is revealed only when 
one is stripped bare of all particular commitments. Rawls deflects 
this objection by recalling that political liberals do not ask citizens to 
commit themselves to a deeply controversial theory of the self. In- 
stead, they should view their decision to put on the veil as if it were 
similar to "acting a part in a play, say of Macbeth or Lady Macbeth." 
This decision no more commits them to the Kantian metaphysics of 
"unencumbered selfhood" than playing Macbeth "commits us to 
thinking we are really a king or a queen engaged in a desperate 
* Rawls does not provide any other justification for the veil; see PL 24. 
For further discussion on this point, see my "Why Dialogue?" this JOURNAL, 
LXXVI, 	 1 (January 1989): 5-24, pp. 19-21; and LS, sect. 67. 
l o  Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice (New York: Cambridge, 1982). 
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struggle for political power. Much the same holds for role playing 
generally" (PL 27). 
This response is satisfactory so long as we add an important pro- 
viso. While an actor does not commit himself to really being a king, 
he does commit himself to playing the part of an actor. Before doing 
so, he must persuade himself that this is an activity worth his energy 
and commitment. In making this decision, moreover, a person 
should consider the quality of the roles he can expect to play: he 
may reasonably commit himself to the Shakespearean theater, but 
reasonably reject a lucrative career in pornographic movies and ded- 
icate himself, say, to a lifetime of surfing. 
By the same token, when a person is asked to put on the veil, she is 
committing herself to the role of liberal citizenship; and the lines she 
is asked to speak in this role will have some weight in her answer to 
the ultimate question she has to confront: Is the role of liberal 
citizenship worth the effort that it takes? 
Obviously, there is a lot more to this decision than the dramatic 
quality of the script that a liberal citizen will act out on the stage of 
political life. As we have seen, the liberal exercise in overlapping 
consensus aims to provide would-be citizens with very fundamental 
reasons, rooted in different comprehensive moral views, for com- 
mitting themselves to liberal citizenship. Thus, if the only plausible 
way to engage in this role were by donning the veil, I would be more 
than willing to play the part. 
But it is quite another thing to make this demand when there is 
another specification of the script that avoids the need for self- 
veiling. It at this point that my Sandellian critique enters. I have not 
rejected the veil because I think it commits anybody to a metaphysi- 
cal theory of the self. I reject it on behalf of a rival device of repre- 
sentation that substitutes neutrality for the veil. Why should citizens 
be obliged to play the role of the unencumbered self when liberal 
dialogue can proceed just as well without imposing this demand? 
If one doggedly pursued Rawls's analogy to Macbeth, one might 
be tempted to respond in aesthetic terms: Is it not a prettier play 
when citizens are running around the civic stage talking about imagi- 
nary veils? But I am sure that Rawls does not support presently 
fashionable efforts to pour aesthetics into political morality. In- 
stead, he would urge us to consult our common commitments to 
political liberalism, and consider whether these principles could be 
deployed to tip the balance in favor of, or against, the continued use 
of the veil as the guiding thought experiment. 
So far as I can see, these principles decisively tip against the veil 
and for neutrality. (But, then again, I am doing the balancing.) My 
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argument is straightforward: as we have seen (principle I), political 
liberals are committed to designing a doctrine that makes as few 
demands as possible on the comprehensive moral commitments of 
its diverse citizens. Given this overriding aim, the veil should be 
rejected because it imposes unnecessary demands. On the one hand, 
Sandellians might reasonably view the request to play with veils as 
simply gratuitous given the availability of an alternative script. For 
the neutralist does not require them to play the part of "unencum- 
bered selves," but invites them to enrich their project of social con- 
stitution by adding another role to their repertoire. 
On the other hand, partisans of Kantian conceptions of the self 
can make no similar complaint if the script is organized along neu- 
tralist lines. Kantians do not deny that empirical selves are consti- 
tuted in part by their social roles; they merely insist that this process 
of social constitution presupposes a prior transcendental deduction 
of the self. It would seem, then, that the neutralist does not offend 
any of the Kantian's comprehensive commitments when proposing 
his conception of public reason, while the Rawlsian veil does place 
an additional obstacle on the path of would-be citizens who are 
committed to Sandellian metaphysics. Some might consider this 
burden to be small-smaller than the burden placed upon the 
would-be actor who weighs the chance that he may be playing por- 
nography instead of Macbeth. Others might consider this burden 
very hea~y.  Whatever its weight, none can deny that veils do impose 
an unnecessary burden, and one that serious political liberals should 
not place gratuitously on the path to the liberal state. 
It follows that Rawls should abandon the veil, and model the use 
of public reason in a liberal state by directly imposing fundamental 
constraints on dialogue of the sort proposed by the neutrality 
principle. 
2. The Difference Principle. Rawls should be particularly wary of 
the veil, since it will no longer get him the results he hoped for in A 
Theory of Justice. His earlier work argued that veiled contractors 
would be rationally compelled to adopt a strongly egalitarian con- 
ception of justice, concerned with maximizing the situation of the 
worst-off class. This argument, however, does not survive the transi- 
tion to Political Liberalism. 
Rawls does not pay much attention to the status of the difference 
principle in his new book. In a single footnote, he remarks that 
"some have thought that my working out the ideas of political lib- 
eralism meant giving up the egalitarian conception of A Theory of 
Justice. I am not aware of any revisions that imply such a change and 
think the surmise has no basis" (PL 7 , n. 6). 
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I disagree, for reasons that require a brief review of basic Rawls- 
iana. It is well known that the argument for the difference principle 
is extremely sensitive to the design of the veil of ignorance." The 
crucial distinction is between a thick and a thin veil. Under a "thin" 
veil, the contractors do not know their class position or their particu- 
lar ideals. But they do know the percentage of the population that 
will find itself in each of the relevant social classes. Under a "thick" 
veil, they are deprived of this information. 
Thickening is critical because Rawls is clearly wrong about the 
difference principle when the contractors are placed behind the thin 
veil. Suppose, for example, that they are allowed to know that the 
upper class will contain ninety percent of the population, with only 
ten percent finding themselves in the lower class. In the absence of 
further information, rational contractors will assume that each will 
also have a ninety percent chance of making it to the upper class 
after the veil lifts. It would seem, then, that they would be very 
foolish to insist on the difference principle-which may maximize a 
ten percent prospect at the cost of very great reductions in the 
prospects they will face most of the time. Of course, they might well 
take the downside risk seriously enough to approach their choice 
with a good deal of risk aversion. But the difference principle re- 
quires them to take risk aversion to ridiculous extremes. In short, 
unless Rawls persuades us to put on a "thick veil," he has in fact 
produced some fancy new arguments for inequality. 
Not, mind you, that the mere acceptance of the "thick veil" clears 
a smooth path for the difference principle. To the contrary, I be- 
lieve that rational actors would reject Rawlsian justice even when 
acting under this extreme condition of ignorance. But at least Rawls 
has more to say for himself once he persuades us to thicken the veil 
so drastically. 
Rawls is well aware of this, and has labored over the years to 
present a persuasive argument for thickening the veil. This has not 
proved an easy task. After all, nobody believes that ignorance is 
positively a good thing, especially when we imagine ourselves mak- 
ing fundamental choices in life. At best, the veil is an analytic tool, 
screening out information that would lead rational actors to bias 
their choices in ways that offend our sense of justice as fairness. But 
the "thin" veil is thick enough to accomplish this objective: the 
contractors have already been deprived of knowledge of their own 
I '  See John Harsanyi, "Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Moral- 
ity? A Critique of John Rawls' Theory," American Political Science Review, LXIX, 2 
Uune 1975): 594-606. 
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ideals and class position and so cannot stack the deck in favor of 
their particular interests. Why, then, does a sense of fairness require 
us to thicken the veil further? 
I had long believed that Rawls had no plausible answer until I 
picked up my copy of his Dewey Lectures'' in the early 1980s, and 
found one. This was a time when Rawls was at the high point of his 
Kantian phase, and it was this inspiration that provided the impulse 
for his defense of the thick veil. The thin veil was inadequate, we 
were told, because it insufficiently dramatized the neo-Kantian di- 
mension of Rawls's thought experiment. By stripping the contrac- 
tors clean of all information, the original position revealed them for 
what they really were-Kantian selves constituted by their sense of 
justice and the power to put meaning into their lives. The thin veil 
was inadequate because it cluttered up the original position with 
other information, and therefore distracted our attention from this 
pristine neo-Kantian depiction of human nature (ibid., pp. 549-50). 
I leave it to neo-Kantians to decide whether they find this con- 
vincing. Only one thing is clear: justifications of this kind have no 
place in Rawls's new world of political liberalism. The entire point of 
the project is to avoid rendering liberal theory hostage to any partic- 
ular metaphysical view. To put the problem dialogcally: Rawls can- 
not respond to Sandel by saying that political liberalism does not 
endorse the Kantian conception of the self, and then turn around 
and say that contractors must employ a "thick" veil because it better 
expresses the Kantian conception of the self! 
And yet, I am sorry to report that this is precisely what happens in 
Political Liberalism: 
Beginning with a state of no information, we allow in just enough 
information to make the agreement rational, though still suitably inde- 
pendent from historical, natural, and social happenstance. Considerably 
more information would be compatible with impartiality but a Kantian 
view seeks more than this (PL 273; emphasis added). 
This comment appears in the book's concluding part 111, which in- 
spires a general caution: part I11 reprints without alteration essays 
written in 1977 and 1981, when Rawls had not yet clearly formu- 
lated his project in political liberalism. It is best to read the new 
book as if it ended with part 11, treating part I11 as a suggestive, but 
problematic, appendix. 
Following my methodological precept, I give priority to the only 
other discussion of the veiling question, even though it appears in a 
l 2  "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," this JOURNAL, LXVII, 9 (Sep-
tember 1980): 515-72. 
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cursory footnote in chapter one. Here Rawls recognizes the error of 
relying on Kantianism to justify the thick veil, and claims to draw the 
notion from "the public political culture of a democratic society" 
(PL 24-5, n. 27). 
But this claim is transparently false. There is no democratic soci- 
ety in the world that adopts the general proposition that "funda- 
mental political decisions are better made in ignorance, and the 
more ignorant the decision maker, the better the decision." To the 
contrary, there is and ought to be a general principle in favor of 
informed decision making. This effort to save the thick veil by a 
direct appeal to "the public political culture" is a nonstarter. 
Perhaps we can redeem the thick veil with a more complicated 
argument. This one does not begn with the perverse claim that 
ignorance is bliss in a democracy, but asserts that the value of impar- 
tiality plays a crucial role in "the public political culture." This claim 
has the ring of truth. Moreover, we have seen that veiling the con- 
tractors is a technique that can be used to express impartiality. The 
trouble comes at the next step-where the Rawlsian tries to explain 
why the concept of impartiality requires us to place the contractors 
behind a thick, as opposed to a thin, veil. Indeed, we have already 
seen that Rawls confesses-albeit in part 111-that this next step 
cannot be successfully taken. We have, then, reached an impasse: 
either Rawls must renounce the thick veil or he must renounce 
political liberalism. 
We have now moved well beyond Rawls's footnote in an effort to 
save the thick veil. Until somebody else comes along and fills this 
gaping hole, Rawlsians are stuck with the thin veil if they hope to 
play by the rules of political liberalism. As a consequence, they must 
reject the difference principle and defend one or another form of 
inequality in the distribution of basic resources. The egalitarian 
commitment of A Theory of Justice does not survive the movement to 
Political Liberalism. 
In contrast, the strong egalitarianism of The Liberal State suffers 
no similar embarrassment. At no point does its model of public 
reason require participants to place their particular identities be- 
hind any veil, thick or thin. They are asked to enrich their social 
identities, not impoverish them. When they play their part on the 
civic stage, liberal citizens can be completely aware of all that they 
are, and are entitled to say to one another that their actual life 
identities and projects are good-even infinitely good. They are 
speaking for themselves, not some deracinated creatures. 
This does not mean, of course, that they can say anything they 
like. Like every other social role, liberal citizenship imposes severe 
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constraints on appropriate behavior. Just as good workers or neigh- 
bors or sportsmen recognize the bounds of appropriate behavior 
within their collective enterprises, so too must liberal citizens. While 
they are free to proclaim the goodness of their good, neutrality 
forbids them from asserting that their good is any better than those 
affirmed by their fellow citizens. This is, of course, a very strong 
constraint on public reason. Nonetheless, The Liberal State estab-
lishes that citizens constrained by neutrality can endorse strongly 
egalitarian principles for the distribution of basic resources. 
Doubtless, my efforts to elaborate these neutral dialogues suffer 
from all sorts of particular difficulties. But at no point do they suffer 
from the methodological problems we have been discussing. At no 
point are liberal citizens asked to guess who they might become after 
they lift a veil. At no point are they asked to trade off the chance 
they will be rich against the chance they will be poor. And it is the 
necessity of making this trade off that leads Rawls's rational contrac- 
tors, operating under a thin veil, to choose inequality in the name of 
justice. 
Rawls is wrong, then, to suppose that his new commitment to 
political liberalism is compatible with his older commitments to the 
original position and equality. When faced with this basic inconsis- 
tency, will he discard the "veil of ignorance" he developed decades 
before he recognized the distinctive aspirations of political 
liberalism? 
111. IS LIBERALISM CONSERVATIVE? 
I next consider the foundations of political liberalism. Rawls por- 
trays the doctrine as if it were deeply dependent upon the "public 
political culture of a democratic society." The sources of this culture 
are quite limited, "compris[ing] the political institutions of a consti- 
tutional regime and the public traditions of their interpretation (in- 
cluding those of the judiciary), as well as historic texts and 
documents that are common knowledge" (PL 14). On this view, 
political liberalism is parasitic upon liberal practice. Rawls seems 
unwilling to present the doctrine as a freestanding ideal-some- 
thing that political liberals everywhere should not only talk about, 
but fight and die for. 
His repeated invocations of "public political culture" should be 
distinguished from his appeals to "overlapping consensus." This sec- 
ond notion has to do with ideas, not practices. It claims that the best 
way to defend political liberalism is by demonstrating its rational 
support in a variety of comprehensive doctrines-ranging from 
neo-Kantianism through pragmatic humanism through liberal Ca- 
tholicism, and beyond. I support "overlapping consensus." Indeed, 
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it is this very support which leads me to reject Rawls's invitation to 
look upon political liberalism as an Anglo-American provincialism 
now (temporarily?) ascendant in Europe and elsewhere. 
My argument is straightforward. If, as "overlapping consensus" 
insists, men and women of many different moral and religous ideals 
can reason to a common commitment to political liberalism, why 
should this principled commitment not carry over to cases in which 
liberals are not in control of the political culture? If political liberal- 
ism is convincing enough to motivate a struggle to defend it where it 
is ascendant, why is it not convincing enough to inspire a struggle to 
create it? 
The answer, if there is one, is to be found in the way Rawls uses 
the appeal to "public political culture" in his larger argument. With 
two large exceptions to be noted later, this concept does not do very 
much real work-so long as we are careful to distinguish it from 
"overlapping consensus." Indeed, if Rawls had taken seriously his 
appeals to existing political culture, he would have written a very 
different book. The revised version of Political Liberalism would 
have begun with reflections on the great political events that serve as 
the historical foundation of modern liberal polities-from the sign- 
ing of Magna Carta through the Protestant Reformation through 
the English Revolution through the American and French Revolu- 
tions through the Great Liberal Reforms of nineteenth-century En- 
gland and Reconstruction America through the English Welfare 
State and the American New Deal. At each point, Rawls would have 
pondered the great documents that expressed the evolving "public 
culture" of liberalism in England, America, and the Continent. 
After developing this historical background, he would have moved 
to the last triumphant half-century, when liberalism leaps far 
beyond its traditional homelands. To what extent has this world- 
historical leap given new meaning to modern "political culture?" 
I would be the last to deny the value of such an effort-it has 
provided me with my principal agenda for the last fifteen years.13 
While Rawls has some nice things to say about my work, such histor- 
icizing exercises do not-and should not-provide him with his 
main inspiration. Instead, he is engaged with the ideas of Locke and 
Mill, Kant and Hegel. The power of Rawls's work owes itself entirely 
to his creative reshaping of abstract philosophical arguments in- 
herited from the Western tradition. Given this fact, it is important to 
recall that neither Locke nor Kant nor even Mill wrote at a time 
l 3  See my We the People and The Future of Liberal Revolution (New Haven: 
Yale, 1992). 
377 POLITICAI. LIBERALISMS 
when liberalism was ascendant in the "public political culture." In- 
stead, they wrote with the intention of changing their cultures in 
profound ways. 
So should today's political liberals. No nation on earth has 
achieved the kind of social justice to which political liberalism 
aspires. As a consequence, every existing political culture is papered 
over with thousands of apologetic documents that explain why jus- 
tice cannot be done. This unhappy state of affairs is entirely consis- 
tent with the construction of an "overlapping consensus" on 
matters of political value. It is remarkably easy for men and women 
to forget their political principles in their eagerness to use state 
power for their own aggrandizement-and then write up fancy 
pieces of paper proclaiming their public virtue. Political liberalism 
would turn into provincial rationalization if it followed Rawls's ad- 
vice. The fact that the sacred texts of American "political culture" 
deny citizens their fundamental right to a decent minimum income 
is part of the problem, not the solution. Similarly, Germany's recent 
decision to limit the right of political asylum represents a fundamen- 
tal breach with liberal ideals-no matter how good the Germans 
turn out to be in producing public documents that propel their 
"political culture" in illiberal directions. 
The task is to criticize political culture, not rationalize it; to 
change it for the better, and struggle against authoritarian regres- 
sion. If this is true in those morally ambiguous polities which pass 
for "liberal democracies," it is even truer in those vast areas where 
liberal principles are treated with contempt. Political liberalism is a 
revolutionary doctrine, based on a radical idea-that men and 
women of different beliefs can establish a fair political system that 
grants all participants the equal right to live their own lives in their 
own way. The ultimate challenge of liberal philosophy is to show just 
how radical this idea is-by imagming worlds in which liberal citi- 
zens actually succeed in making this promise into a reality. Such 
imaginary worlds are, of course, light years away from the grim 
realities we confront. The distance is so great that it would be mad- 
ness to use the conclusions of ideal theory as the unmediated basis 
for a practical action program. 
Nonetheless, we urgently require utopian speculation. It is just 
too easy to abandon hope, and leave politics entirely to power- 
hungry cynics. Given the world as it is, the promise of liberal politics 
can only be made evident through acts of imagination. The bright 
image of liberal citizens successfully engaged in the project of public 
reason serves as a profound rebuke to the existing public culture- 
emphasizing areas where present polities fall grievously short, pro- 
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voking the more sober-minded part of our souls to consider 
whether, for all the difficulties, we cannot make some genuine steps 
toward realizing the promise of equal freedom for all. 
It is especially important to revitalize the speculative side of lib- 
eralism today, after the long hard night of the twentieth century. 
During the struggles with Nazism and communism, it was hard 
enough for liberals to preserve the status quo against the onslaught 
of totalitarian pretension. Understandably, this long period of de- 
fense led many sober minds to decry the ease with which utopian 
thought can be perverted into an apologia for mass murder and 
crushing conformity.14 But after 1989, another danger will become 
increasingly clear-deprived of the moral challenges of the cold 
war, status quo liberalism may easily degenerate into the cynical 
pursuit of self-interest, yielding a politics that will entirely discredit 
liberalism's revolutionary promise. 
I am therefore entirely unrepentant about the emphatically uto- 
pian tone adopted by The Liberal State. On countless occasions, I 
have been asked-often with poorly concealed condescension- 
whether it really makes sense to begn political philosophy by imag- 
ing that you and I were on a spaceship whose aim is the colonization 
of a new world. But we are on a spaceship. It is called the planet 
earth. While this world is laden with ancient injustices, the liberal 
commitment to public reason should lead us to deny that the real is 
the rational. We must instead subject the existing political culture to 
comprehensive, if speculative, dialogic critique. This is the point of 
my utopian thought experiment. 
Its rewards are brought into relief by contrasting it with Rawls's 
approach. I do not wish to exaggerate. Although Rawls says that he 
is merely elaborating the premises of existing political cultures, his 
conservative bark is worse than his bite. Nonetheless, there are cru- 
cial moments at which his deference to existing practice seriously 
compromises his vision. Most notably, there is the matter of state 
boundaries-our nasty habit of drawing magic lines and excluding 
those unlucky enough to be born beyond the pale. This technique 
provides rich people a priceless resource in their ongoing struggle 
to rationalize their holdings of unequal resources. Even when they 
recognize some kind of redistributive obligation to poor people 
within their own state, they refuse to recognize a comparable obliga- 
tion elsewhere. Most white residents of Los Angeles, for example, 
l4 See, e.g., Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays o n  Liberty (New York: Oxford, 1969); 
Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University Press, 1944); Michael 
Oakeshott, O n  H u m a n  Conduct (New York: Oxford, 1975); Karl Popper, The 
Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton: University Press, 1950). 
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recognize a duty to help poor blacks three thousand miles away in 
Harlem whom they have never seen. But when they encounter even 
poorer blacks in the flesh on their holiday in Jamaica, similar 
thoughts rarely come to mind. And so far as illegal Mexican immi- 
grants in their midst are concerned, these aliens should be expelled 
immediately! 
The Liberal State challenges this deeply entrenched political prac- 
tice. It denies that rich Westerners can fence out their problems of 
justice merely by pointing out that foreigners are born "elsewhere" 
(LS 89-93). This does not imply that liberal states can never fence 
out. A sudden influx of millions of aliens may destroy the art of 
liberal politics itself, especially if these foreigners are untrained in 
the ways of liberal dialogue. Within the framework of dialogic lib- 
eralism, no individual right is more precious than the right of the 
liberal community to sustain the ongoing process of public reason 
that serves as the constituting matrix for all other rights. It follows 
that there nlay be some grounds for restriction in real-world states: 
too many immigrants flooding the country at one time might under- 
mine the fabric of liberal discourse. But this escape hatch should be 
exercised with great care, given the ease with which it may be abused 
(LS 91-5).15 If a limitation on immigration is acceptable at all, it 
must be accompanied by a massive increase in foreign aid (LS 256- 
7). Only in this way can we make it clear that, in limiting immigra- 
tion, we reject the ridiculous proposition that liberal states can solve 
the problem of social justice by fencing out people who happen to 
be born "elsewhere." 
Perhaps I am wrong about this, but at least my utopian thought 
experiment forces my readers to confront the question. Not so 
Rawls's version of Political Liberalism: "I assume that the basic 
structure is that of a closed society: that is, we are to regard it as 
self-contained and as having no relations with societies. Its members 
enter it only by birth and leave it only by death" (PL 12). Rawls 
admits that this move involves a "considerable abstraction," but in- 
sists that liberal thought should begin with the case of the com- 
pletely closed society, totally insulated from other societies. 
I could not disagree more. Rawls's move is deeply hostile to the 
larger aspirations of political liberalism. As we have seen, this proj- 
ect begms with the idea that pluralism "is a permanent feature of 
l5 Given the nature of this exception, it is particularly difficult to justify the 
exclusion of immigrants who fought for liberalism in their native lands, and run 
the risk of punishment if forced to return "home." Given their sacrifices for 
liberal principles, there is no reason to suppose that their admission will under- 
mine the vitality of liberal dialogue by the admitting state. 
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the public culture, and not a mere historical condition soon to pass 
away." While alien individuals and groups seem different from us, 
political liberals refuse to deal with the shock of disagreement by 
insulating their own group from the aliens. Down this path lies in- 
creasing xenophobia and violent repression. The challenge is to join 
strangers in a common project of political cooperation, grounded in 
a mutual recognition of each individual's equal right to be different. 
Rather than seek to include immigrants in this liberal process of 
public reason, Western nations deal with "aliens" by excluding them 
at the frontier. It is this choice of force over reason which makes 
present-day immigration practices a scandal of the liberal West. By 
begnning his thought experiment with the notion of a completely 
closed society, Rawls makes it easy to ignore this glaring injustice. 
The assumption is also false to the facts of modern life. Reading 
Rawls's stipulation of a closed society in the evening, I reviewed the 
events of my day. Oversleeping my alarm clock made in Taiwan, I 
had hurriedly thrown on clothes manufactured variously in China, 
India, Italy, and England. I then sat down to my only All-American 
event: breakfast-glancing through The New York Times to read 
about the tragedy in Bosnia and the threats of nuclear attack from 
North Korea. I then jumped into my German car, speeding through 
the slums of New Haven, to spend a profitable morning pounding 
away at my Japanese word-processor in my Yale office. Lunch was at 
an Indian restaurant with friends who enthusiastically championed 
the latest crazy ideas coming out of Paris. I proceeded to the 
classroom to give a talk on justice to a large multinational student 
body, following this up with one-on-one conversations with four 
graduate students-two Americans, one Japanese, one Indian. My 
wife and I then went to dinner at a Chinese restaurant to hear 
friends describe their recent trip to Greece. I am sure Rawls's life is 
not too different, and that the typical day of a Dutch or Italian 
intellectual is even more cosmopolitan. Why, then, should we not 
begin analysis from the vantage point of an open society, rather than 
a closed one? 
But, it may be objected, only effete upper-class intellectuals live 
like rootless cosmopolitans. Most Americans are much more insu- 
lated from the cultural and economic benefits of international ex- 
change. This populist rhetoric is false to the facts. While the upper 
class gets distinctive benefits from cosmopolitanism, average people 
also profit greatly. This is the lesson of fifty years of successful free- 
trade policies. Moving beyond narrow economics, the culture of 
average Americans is not "made in the U.S.A." Even home-grown 
religions, like Mormonism and Christian Science, are unthinkable 
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without locating them in a more cosmopolitan context. If this is true 
of America, it is even truer in other nations. 
What, then, justifies Rawls's culturally improbable, and morally 
problematic, postulate of closure? Rawls takes up this question in a 
recent essay on the "Law of Peoples." l6  He defends his premise on 
the ground that "peoples as corporate bodies organized by their 
governments now exist in some form all over the world. Historically 
speaking, all principles and standards proposed for the law of peo- 
ples must, to be feasible, prove acceptable to the considered and 
reflective public opinion of peoples and their governments" (LP 
50).The last three words suggest how much Rawls has capitulated to 
existing political culture. Of course, government officials will not 
accept a fundamental critique of existing boundaries-their politi-
cal power presupposes their legitimacy. Giving them a veto on the 
question of boundaries is like giving the rich a veto on the distribu- 
tion of wealth." Rather than pander to government officials, politi- 
cal liberals should try to convince "reflective public opinion" in all 
nations of the need to discipline state power by the rigorous de- 
mands of public reason. 
Instead of furthering this enterprise, Rawls proposes a disaster- 
ous political compromise with authoritarian regirnes throughout the 
world. According to him, we must distinguish between hierarchical 
societies that are "well-ordered" and the really bad places. The well- 
ordered hierarchies might be theocratic in their laws, authoritarian 
in their politics, and paternalist in their social organization. None- 
theless, the bosses of a "well-ordered" hierarchy sincerely believe 
that they are serving the common good, and are even prepared to 
consult with followers before using force to bring them into line. 
Better yet, they are prepared to give their citizens a (very) little bit of 
freedom before cracking down on dissenting activities.'* Above all, 
they will not attack us good guys. 
l6 In On Human Rights, Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley, eds. (New York: 
Basic, 1993), pp. 41-82. Henceforth cited as LP. 
l 7  Granting a veto power to government officials is especially surprising given 
Rawls's recognition that many boundaries are "arbitrary . . . from a historical 
point of view" (LP 56-7). 
I s  Rawls's grudging notion of human rights is conveyed by his grim insistence 
that "well-ordered" hierarchies must provide "at least certain minimum rights to 
means of subsistence and security (the right to life), to liberty (freedom from 
slavery, serfdom, and forced occupations), and (personal) property, as well as to 
formal equality as expressed by the rules of natural justice (for example, that 
similar cases be treated similarly)" (LP 62). Other passages stipulate that "individ- 
uals do not have the right of free speech as in a liberal society. . . [but] they have 
the right at some point in the process of consultation to express political dissent" 
(LP 62). They are also vouchsafed "a measure of liberty of conscience and free- 
dom of thought, even if these freedoms are not in general equal for all members 
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So long as authoritarians satisfy these very minimal minima, Rawls 
urges liberal states to reach a principled understanding with them. 
The veil of ignorance provides the crucial means for defining the 
terms of the new world order. Representatives of "well-ordered" 
states should put themselves behind a veil in which they do not know 
whether they come from liberal or hierarchical polities. Unsurpris- 
ingly, this veiling procedure generates a Rawlsian social contract 
that consolidates the right of authoritarian states to oppress their 
dissenting citizens-so long, that is, as they remain "well-ordered" 
and use the "rule of law" when throwing their troublemakers 
into jail. 
Even within the limited horizons of 1994, Rawls is much too ac- 
commodationist. The short list of human rights enumerated by his 
"law of peoples" is embarrassingly impoverished when contrasted to 
the pronouncements of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.lg After 1989, liberals can and should insist on taking the 
declaration seriously in the emerging law of nations. 
But Rawls is not playing the hard-nosed foreign policy analyst. He 
is saying that it is right in principle for liberal states to make a social 
contract with "well-ordered" authoritarianisms. To support this 
claim, he occasionally indulges in relativistic disparagement of lib- 
eral principles (LP 65, 66, 69, 70). But I fail to see why relativism 
should be dispositive even if I were convinced that it was true.*' The 
fact is that none of Rawls's "well-ordered" hierarchies will be free of 
natives who are themselves inspired by liberal ideas of liberty and 
equality. There is no Islamic nation without a woman who insists on 
equal rights; no Confucian society without a man who denies the 
need for deference. Sometimes these liberals will be in a minority in 
of society" (LP 63). Given this bleak picture, it is perfectly understandable that 
Rawls insists that his "well-ordered" despotism "must allow for the right of emi- 
gration" (LP 63). Unfortunately, he does not attempt a sustained discussion of 
the obligations of liberal states to admit these and other emigrants. 
l 9  The Universal Declaration begins with the ringing statement that "all human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights" (art. l ) ,  proceeds to bar 
"discrimination of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status" (art. 
2), insists that "everyone has the right to take part in the government of his 
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives" (art. 21), and defines 
many other rights that go far beyond Rawls's notion of a "well-ordered" hierar-
chy. The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights- 
which entered into force in 1976 with the assent of leading nations of all areas of 
the world-guarantees economic rights that also go well beyond Rawls's very 
cautious remarks on this subject (see n. 23). The relevant documents are collected 
by Louis Henkin et al., eds., Basic Documents Supplement to International Law, 
(St. Paul: West, 1987, 2nd ed.), ch. 12. 
20 I defer a discussion of this matter to another time. 
their native lands; but given the way Rawls defines a "well-ordered" 
hierarchy, it is even possible that native liberals might be in a major- 
ity. Given these facts, the West must choose, and why should we 
choose to betray our own principles and side with the oppressors 
rather than the oppressed? 
Please do not invoke the alleged right of nations to resist interfer- 
ence from outside. Nationalism is no less a Western concept than 
the liberal ideal of public reason.*' And it is a good deal less funda- 
mental. If Westerners insist on using public reason to test the claims 
of their own nation-states, why should they turn a blind eye when 
liberals in other lands make the same demand? 
Kawls is right to suggest that Western liberal states will not always 
be able to move beyond moralizing condemnation to effective action 
on behalf of human rights. But it is one thing for liberal states to 
confess a lack of power; quite another, to enter into a Rawlsian 
cornpact with "well-ordered" dictatorships which endows them with 
legitimate authority. 
In addition to trendy relativism, Rawls invokes Kant to support his 
belief that: "a world government-by which I mean a unified politi- 
cal regime with the legal powers normally exercised by central gov- 
ernments-would be either a global despotism or else a fragile 
empire torn by frequent civil strife as various regions and peoples 
try to gain political autonomy" (LP 54-5). Even if this were true, I 
fail to see why it justifies anything more than a nlodus vivendi with 
oppressor states. 
Nor am I impressed with Kant's credentials as the leading political 
scientist of the twenty-first century. It is true, of course, that we are 
a long way away from world federalism. Over the next generation, 
progress toward this distant goal will come, if it comes at all, at the 
level of regional federation. The most important struggle will be 
over European union. If the Europeans conquer the nationalistic 
madness of the twentieth century, and create a federal union, an 
even more expansive federation may not look so crazy to the next 
generation. If the Europeans fail, political liberalism is in for an- 
other age of anxiety. 
This is, if you like, an unfashionably Eurocentric diagnosis. But 
Americans have an important role to play as well. We have also 
begun a regional project by redefining the boundaries of our free- 
trade area to include Canada and Mexico. If this initiative is success- 
ful, North Americans may find the political will to use it as the basis 
For a brilliant account of the genesis of modern nationalism, see Benedict 
Anderson, Imagined Communzties (London: Verso, rev. ed. 1991). 
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of a more perfect union-in which the free movement of goods is 
followed by the free movement of people and then by the construc- 
tion of a political federation. This project may take longer than the 
European experiment in federation. But we must learn to think big. 
Rawls thinks small even within the boundaries of existing states. 
He tells us that an adequate constitution need not commit the polity 
to the pursuit of social and economic justice. It is enough to guaran- 
tee the classic liberal freedoms, "such as the right to vote and to 
participate in politics, liberty of conscience, freedom of thought and 
of association, as well as the protections of the rule of law," together 
with "a social minimum providing for the basic needs of all citi- 
zens." He denies, however, that the much stronger kind of equality 
guaranteed by the "difference principle" must be enshrined as a 
constitutional first principle.22 
The reason? "The[se] matters are nearly always open to wide dif- 
ferences of reasonable opinion" (PL 229), and so the application of 
the Rawlsian difference principle will not generate the same degree 
of "agreement." True enough, but Rawls fails to note the opposite 
danger: without a constitutional commitment, and sustained institu- 
tional carry-through, the political process may not take the norm of 
economic justice seriously at all. 
This is an especially serious danger, gven the special sort of eco- 
nomic equality that Rawls and I favor. While both of us insist that 
people are entitled to an egalitarian starting point in life, we also 
believe that they should be free to engage in market transactions 
that will predictably generate a large degree of intragenerational 
inequality. This leads to the clear and present danger that each gen- 
eration's market winners will use their economic power to induce 
the political process to favor their own children over kids who were 
unlucky enough to be born to poor parents. 
It may be naive to suppose that any set of constitutional structures 
could effectively control this market-induced tendency to under- 
mine the liberal state's commitment to starting-point equality. But 
without entrenching such an effort in the constitution, the pursuit 
of social justice is likely to turn into a pious fraud-as has been the 
case in the United States. It is essential, then, that a constitution 
make a determined effort to counterbalance the market's predict- 
able erosion of the public commitment to social justice. Political 
22 Rawls later adds "freedom of movement and free choice of occupation" to 
his list of essentials, but distinguishes these freedoms from the fuller version of 
"equal opportunity" developed by his A Theory of Justice. Like the difference 
principle, an expansive conception of "equal opportunity" need not be constitu- 
tionally guaranteed (see PL 228-9). 
liberals will, of course, reasonably disagree about the best practical 
way to implement egalitarian principles for each generation. But 
this should not serve as a reason for avoiding a solemn constitu- 
tional commitment in the first place. While the continuing effort to 
pursue social justice will generate lots of controversy, political quies- 
cence should not be purchased at the expense of the worst-off class. 
This turn away from equality was also the consequence of Rawls's 
"law of peoples," his first great compromise with the existing "politi- 
cal culture." By consigning most of the world's poor people to the 
tender mercies of "well-ordered" a~thoritarianisms,~~ by demoting 
the pursuit of equality from constitutional rank in the West, Politi-
cal Liberalism drains A Theory of Justice of much of its practical 
force. Even by Rawlsian lights, the American constitution is not 
perfect. Unlike modern European documents,** it does not guaran- 
tee the "social minimum" that Rawls specifies as a "constitutional 
essential." Nor does this unhappy state of affairs show any sign of 
changing soon. Nevertheless, the gap between ideal and reality is 
not too too large, is it? 
This is not philosophy, but apologetics. 
IV. THE COMMUNITARIAN FOUNDATION O F  LIBERAL RIGHTS 
You have been witnessing a dispute within the family. It is best to 
conclude by returning to first principles and stating why Rawls is 
right to advance political liberalism (stripped of its conservative and 
statist gloss) as a genuinely important philosophical option. 
Consider the present struggle between communitarians and lib- 
erals for intellectual ascendancy. This debate has now been reduced 
to stylized banality: "liberals," we are told, champion the abstract 
rights of isolated individuals; "communitarians" urge us to discover 
our concrete identities as committed members of ongoing communi- 
ties; and on and on. 
For political liberals, this tired debate is based upon a false dichot- 
omy. Political liberals do not seek to ground rights directly upon any 
notion of abstract individualism, Kantian or other. Their fundamen- 
tal appeal is to community, albeit a community of a special kind: one 
23 At one point, Rawls does suggest that his "law of peoples" imposes a duty on 
rich states to help the poor beyond their borders. This duty is not based on "some 
liberal principle of distributive justice," but on Rawls's claim that "well-ordered" 
authoritarian states must fulfil "basic human needs" (LP 76). Unfortunately, the 
derivation of this obligation is not transparent, nor is the method by which "basic 
needs" are to be identified. But the rigors of Rawls's doctrine could be amelior- 
ated by the vigorous development of these suggestions. Surely the Rawlsian frame- 
work is capable of a more internationalist development; see Thomas Pogge, 
Realizing Rawls (Ithaca: Cornell, 1989),part 3. 
24 See, e.g., Grundgesetz: Volume 11,Kommentar, Theodor Maunz and Guenter 
Duerig, eds. (Miinchen: Beck, 1991), art. 20. 
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in which members respect each others' deep disagreements, but are 
nonetheless determined to work with one another to build a form of 
public reason that will unite them in a common dialogue that all can 
share, despite their other differences. 
The overriding aim is not to glorify the unfettered individual, but 
to construct a concrete form of identity that all community 
members can affirm in good conscience. To do this, we must design 
the role of liberal citizenship with great care, making it a loose- 
fitting garment that many can wear without grave discomfort as they 
enter the public forum. 
This is why debates about the structure of public reason play a 
central role in the ongoing philosophical enterprise. It is only when 
citizens can come to terms about the appropriate models of public 
argument-using the veil of ignorance, the neutrality constraint, or 
other to-be-invented constructs-that they can proceed to the busi- 
ness of social justice. Having fashioned a civic discourse of public 
reason, they can use it in a common effort to control the basic 
structures of society that would otherwise evolve by mere force and 
accident. 
Only at this stage does liberal talk of rights gain centrality. A 
citizen has a fundamental right to a resource when the balance of 
public reason decisively favors his interests over others. There are 
no such things as natural rights; only those which can be redeemed 
through the engaged conversation of liberal citizens, operating 
under a model of public reason that recognizes that a diversity of 
moral and religious ideals "is not a mere historical condition that 
may soon pass away." 
Both Rawls and I believe that, if we reason together on this basis, 
our civic conversation will be more fruitful than many suppose. 
Rather than rapidly confront the bankruptcy of liberal culture, we 
shall move toward a deeper understanding of the requirements of 
liberal justice. These requirements are very onerous. They will re- 
quire centuries of civic labor throughout the world; in the end, they 
will remain unfulfilled. 
Yet political liberalism remains humanity's best hope in a world 
where cultural diversity is not only a fact of life, but a joy of living. 
BRUCE ACKERMAN 
Yale University 
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